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I N T R O D U C T I O N
A. The Standard Form 22 Bond Provides Indemnification Only
Against an Employe's Dishonest and Criminal Acts Resulting in
Loss.
The contract at issue in this case is a standardized
Savings and Loan Bond, Form 22. Through the Bond, Aetna and
Home Savings entered into a contract of indemnification to
replace identical Standard Form 22 coverage previously
issued by Fidelity & Deposit of Maryland ("F&D").

Standard

Form 22 provides a variety of coverages; however, the coverage
involved in this case was indemnification for losses caused or
"resulting directly from" employee dishonesty, as that term is
defined in the contract.
6041.)

(Aetna Bond, Tr. Ex. 343, Rider

That provision of the Aetna Bond covered losses

"sustained by [Home Savings] at any time but discovered during
[Aetna's] Bond Period."

(Id., Preamble.)

The purpose of Standard Form 22 is to protect a
Savings and Loan "against the dishonesty or crime of its
employees."
1936).

Levey v. Jamison, 82 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir.

It does not cover losses caused by the business

practices or strategies of Home Savings itself,

id.

"The

bond is aimed at covering losses that employees intend to cause
their employer, not losses involving fraudulent practices
directed against customers that serve to benefit an employer

acting in concert with the employee."

Continental Corp. v.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 892 F.2d 540, 549 n. 5 (7th Cir.
1989) .
The Bond is a cohesive, integrated document.

Its

multiple provisions intentionally allocate to the insured and
the insurer a defined set of risks and responsibilities.

The

Bond's bright line definition of dishonesty avoids previously
common disputes about what constituted employee dishonesty.
(Rider 6041.)

By requiring the insurer to reimburse the

savings institution for "losses sustained at any time" but only
if they were caused by dishonesty "discovered during the bond
period," Standard Form 22 prevents allocating to one insurer
the consequences of risks covered by a prior carrier's bond.
(Preamble and Section 9.)

By imposing objective and per se

tests to determine when discovery occurs, and by requiring
timely notice as soon as practical to the proper carrier,
disputes about who was the proper insurer are minimized.
(Section 4 and Rider 6091.)
Even more particularly, although the Bond generally
covers all employees, the parties agreed in advance that when
the insured gains knowledge of the dishonest acts of an
employee then coverage for that employee immediately
terminates.

(Section 11.)

By allocating to the insured the

risk of hiring or continuing employment of a dishonest
employee, the Bond discourages such a foolish practice.
-2-

By the

Bond's express proximate cause requirement (Rider 6041), the
insured is discouraged from allowing the root problem of
dishonesty to be compounded by losses that more accurately
reflect poor management, or improper response to the discovery
of employee dishonesty.
Early discovery of dishonesty, early warning to the
proper surety, and prudence in deciding whether to allow a
dishonest employee to begin or continue employment at a Savings
and Loan, are valid goals•

In pursuit of these objectives,

both parties agree in Standard Form 22 to terms with
established meanings to both the surety industry and the
savings and loan industry.

See Sharp v. Federal Savings &

Loan Ins. Corp.. 858 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1988).

When

those terms are properly applied in order to achieve the
intended results, the insured should not be heard to claim
ambiguity or to offer strained interpretations that frustrate
the risk-allocating functions which those provisions serve.
Furthermore, because an insured can obtain on-going
coverage under Standard Form 22 from successive sureties, both
public policy and the provisions of Form 22 require that the
insured provide pertinent information to the new carrier before
expecting uninterrupted coverage. Where a subsequent bond is
purchased to provide unbroken coverage under Standard Form 22,
the insured must inform the new bonding company (here, Aetna)
of those facts which it should have provided to the surety
-3-

under the previous bond (F&D).

Fundamentally, an insured

cannot improve its position or obtain broader coverage than it
had under a previous bond by changing sureties or by entering
into a new Standard Form 22 contract.
B. Aetna's Primary Arguments are Interconnected and Mutually
Consistent with the Purpose of Standard Form 22.
From the very outset of this case, as evidenced by
Aetna's early motion to add Home's prior bond carrier (F&D)
as a necessary party, Aetna has contended that if Standard
Form 22 coverage was available to Home, it was under F&D's
bond.

In any event, several specific provisions of Aetna's

Bond absolutely preclude Home's claims for coverage from Aetna.
Home's management knew it had a dishonest employee
and had fired him seven months before it applied for the Bond
(Point I).

Management knew that its employee was involved in a

series of unusual loans which had been previously approved by
management and which were going bad before Home contracted with
Aetna (Point II).

Management failed to provide timely notice

in order to lock in coverage under F&D's bond (Point VI).
Instead, Home's management speculated on the outcome of these
events and did not notify F&D or inform Aetna until months
after the Bond was in place that the AFCO investors had filed
suit and were beincj sued by Home, or that Home was already
booking losses related to the investor loans (Point III).
trial, there was ample evidence that Home's management, by
-4-

At

voluntarily entering into an intimate business relationship
with the Grant Affleck companies on a speculative investment
scheme, was the primary or overriding cause of the loss
(Point V ) .
Aetna's consistent analysis also applies to the other
issues raised on appeal.

The AFCO investor losses resulted

from a business decision involving trading in securities, a
risk specifically excluded under the Aetna Bond (Points IV and
VIII)•

In addition, even given the trial court's unwaivering

efforts to find coverage, the court improperly refused to grant
Aetna an offset for the financial benefit which Home received
from its participation in the AFCO scheme (Point VII).

In

bringing this action, Home's management has tried to evade its
responsibility for the losses by using Larry Glad as a
scapegoat.

Home seeks to shift the burden of the losses to

Aetna, which came on the scene long after the occurrence of all
pertinent events and without knowledge of any relevant facts.
The points raised in Aetna's brief are alternative legal means
to prevent Home's legal subterfuge and to arrive at a just
result, giving effect to the jury's intention that Home Savings
should bear the burden of its own business decisions.
This appeal is necessary in order to correct
fundamental errors made by the trial court in its refusal to
enforce the terms of the parties' Standard Form 22 fidelity
contract.

In ruling as it did, the trial court condoned the
-5-

practice of postponing notice of dishonesty to the prejudice of
a surety which is informed of the risks only after a new policy
has been issued; it confused the consequences of employee
dishonesty with the consequences of bad management; and it
expanded the coverage of the insurance contract beyond its
actual and intended terms.

C.

Rules for Interpretation of Bonds.
In its responsive brief, Home Savings does not

dispute the established rules of insurance contract
enforcement.

(See Appellants Brief at 27-29.)

Instead, Home

claims that the Bond contains ambiguous provisions and that
ambiguity must be construed in favor of the insured.

This

general rule of construing ambiguous terms in favor of the
insured does not apply in the present context for two reasons.
First, Standard Form 22 is not ambiguous.

Many courts have

considered the Standard Form 22 and found it to be
unambiguous.

See, e.g., Sharp, 858 F.2d at 1044-46.

Home identifies no ambiguities in the contract itself, and only
implies ambiguity in the Bond application.

The Application

form was not ambiguous to the jury, which concluded from a
layman's perspective that Home made misrepresentations about
prior losses in the application process.
below.)

-6-

(See Point III,

Secondly, Home's argument implies that Standard
Form 22 was the result of Aetna's unilateral drafting.

To the

contrary, Standard Form 22 is a product of arms' length
negotiation between the Surety Association of America, an
industry-wide collection of bonding carriers, and its
counterpart, the

U.S. League of Savings & Loan Associations,

an industry-wide group of savings associations.

See

Affidavit of Frances X. LeMunyon at tab L of Aetna's Document
Addendum.

See also. Sharp, 858 F.2d at 1046.

(The Sharp

opinion is an excellent summary of the history and meaning of
Standard Form 22.)

As a result, the usual rule that ambiguity

is construed against the drafter of a document is inappropriate
in the context of Standard Form 22.
If anything, the language of the Bond has suffered
only at the hands of Home's strained and unusual reading.

The

jury gave the language of the Bond and the Application their
"usual and natural meaning" and found, to the extent allowed,
in favor of Aetna.

See LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life

Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah 1988).

It was the

trial court, at the considerable urging of Home Savings, which
ignored the "existing circumstances [and] the purpose of the
policy," id., and which, through interpretation and blatant
interpolation reached the wrong conclusion.

"Ambiguity must

appear on the bond or policy and cannot be read into it by a

-7-

strained interpretation in order to permit recovery."

35

Am.Jur.2d, Fidelity Bonds and Insurance. § 3, p. 505 (1988).
The special rules of interpretation do
indeed apply only when there is an
ambiguity; courts ought not to strain to
find such ambiguities, if, in so doing,
they defeat probable intentions of the
parties. This is so even when the result
is an apparently harsh consequence to the
insured.
Calcasieu-Marine National Bank v. American Employers'
Insurance Co., 533 F.2d 290, 296 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S. Ct. 319, 50 L.Ed. 2d 289 (1976).
POINT I
SECTION 11 OF THE BOND PRECLUDES COVERAGE
FOR LOSS FROM LARRY GLAD'S CONDUCT BECAUSE
HOME SAVINGS LEARNED OF HIS DISHONESTY
SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE THE BOND WAS PURCHASED.
Introduction.
Section 11 of Standard Form 22 provides that fidelity
coverage for a given employee terminates immediately and
automatically as soon as the insured employer learns that an
employee is dishonest.

Courts have repeatedly found that

provisions identical or similar to Section 11 are valid,
unambiguous, and enforceable.

E.g., Alfalfa Electric

Cooperative, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 376 F. Supp.
901, 912 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.. 426 F.2d 499, 500 (8th Cir. 1970),

-8-

Verneco, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co,, 219 So. 2d 508, 510
(La. 1969).
This well understood provision is based on solid
public policy.

A surety insures for the actuarial risk that an

unknown member of the general population of employees may be
dishonest thereby causing a loss. However, once an employer
learns of dishonesty by a specific employee, the risk is no
longer based on actuarial possibilities.

When the employer

knows of an employee's predisposition to dishonesty, neither
the surety nor the employer should expect further coverage for
that employee unless the parties contract for special
re-inclusion of that employee in the bond.

Therefore, although

there may have been initial coverage for Larry Glad under the
F&D policy, there was no coverage by F&D for losses caused by
Glad's conduct which occurred subsequent to Home's discovery of
his dishonesty.

Nor was there renewed coverage for Larry Glad

under the Aetna Bond for any of Larry Glad's conduct because
his known dishonesty was not disclosed to Aetna.

A. The Correct Judicial Application of Section 11.
Section 11 of Aetna's Bond precluded coverage from
ever going into effect as to Larry Glad.

Aetna, as a new

bonding company, did not "assume liability for losses resulting
from acts committed before the inception of [the bond] by an
employee who was never within the coverage of the [bond]."
-9-

C. Douglas Wilson & Co, v. Insurance Co, of North America,
590 F.2d 1275f 1279r n. 6. (4th Cir. 1979), cert, denied,
444 U.S. 831 (1979).

As in Ritchie Grocer, supra., where

the employee's dishonesty was discovered before he was hired,
coverage under Aetna's policy never went into effect for Larry
Glad.
The courts which have considered employee dishonesty
discovered before the effective date of a new Bond have
universally held that coverage never goes into effect for the
known dishonest employee.

In St. Joe Paper Co. v. Hartford

Accident and Indemnity Co., 359 F.2d 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1966),
the Bond provided for cancellation "immediately upon discovery
by the Insured . . . of any fraudulent or dishonest act on the
part of such Employee."

As in the present case, "[P]rior to

the inception of these policies, St. Joe Paper Company came
into the possession of both information and knowledge that
Jones had committed a dishonesty which, under the recited terms
of the policies, barred recovery."

Id. at 583.

Similarly, in Verneco, supra., the employee
(Walden) was convicted of theft on November 2, 1960 and hired
by the plaintiff companies with knowledge of that conviction in
November 1961. Plaintiffs purchased a policy effective
July 14, 1962 and discovered in December 1964 that Walden had
been misappropriating funds and committing forgeries while in
their employ.

The court found that "no coverage ever obtained
-10-

insofar as Walden was concerned because the insured obtained
knowledge of Walden's dishonest acts at least in November 1961
prior to the inception date of the policy in July 1962."

219

So, 2d at 510.
An identical result was reached in Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Central Bank of Houston. 672 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.
App. 1984), specifically in the context of a renewal bond.
court in that case held:

The

"A renewal policy does not reinstate

coverage for an employee that had already been terminated by a
known dishonest act; it simply continues whatever coverage
existed at the time of renewal."

Id. at 647.

B. The Error in Home Savings' Analysis.
Home argues that Aetna's Bond covered Larry Glad
because Section 11 voids coverage only for losses arising
from actions subsequent to discovery of an employee's
dishonesty ("subsequent losses").

This argument is only valid

as to the F&D Bond, which was in place at the time the
dishonesty and the likelihood of loss were discovered.

Of

course, F&D could not avoid losses incurred as a direct result
of Glad's conduct which occurred before his dishonesty was
discovered.

However, F&D would not be responsible for losses

caused by subsequent conduct if Home had elected to keep Larry
Glad on the payroll after mid-December 1981. And Aetna, which
only accepted an actuarial risk for the general employee
-11-

population, never accepted any risk for loss from Glad's
misconduct.
Home also argues that because Glad's dishonesty prior
to Home's learning of such dishonesty "permeated" or affected
34 of the 36 AFCO investor loans, coverage for the loss on
those 34 loans was not terminated.

This would be true if Aetna

(instead of F&D) had provided coverage at the time of Home's
discovery of Larry Glad's dishonesty.

But it is not true where

Aetna's coverage commenced more than seven months after the
dishonesty was discovered and where Home already knew that
losses on the AFCO investor loans would likely occur.
The issue of whether Section 11 precludes coverage
under a newly issued bond for both "prior losses," as well as
"subsequent losses," was addressed in the leading case of
C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America,
590 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1979), cert, denied. 444 U.S. 831
(1979).

The pertinent facts in Wilson & Co. v. INA are

almost identical to those in the present case.

Wilson was a

mortgage subsidiary of a bank holding company.

On March 16,

1973, Barksdale, then an employee and vice president of Wilson,
was found to have falsely certified information on HUD forms
regarding the dates and amounts of advances to loan customers.
Wilson did not notify its fidelity bond insurer, St. Paul Fire
& Marine, of Barksdale's actions.

On March 25, 1973, INA and

Hartford combined to issue new fidelity coverage for Wilson.
-12-

Hartford's and INA's contracts were "loss discovered" bonds, as
was Aetna's herein.
Five weeks after the first discovery of Barksdale's
dishonesty, Wilson learned that earlier he had also falsely
certified receipt of letters of credit required by the FHA to
insure loans.

Losses resulted and Wilson asserted fidelity

claims against INA and Hartford.

Both insurers denied coverage

because of Wilson's knowledge of Barksdale's unrelated
dishonesty on March 16, 1973, before the INA and Hartford
fidelity bonds became effective.

The court concluded that

under the operation of the termination clauses of their
policies coverage for Barksdale never went into effect.
at 1278.

Id.

(The INA termination clause was identical to the

Aetna Section 11 clause.

Id., at 1277 n. 3, 1278.)

Since we conclude that Barksdale's false
certification of pre-advances constitutes
dishonesty as a matter of law and that
Wilson had knowledge of it before the
inception of the INA and Hartford policies,
and since Wilson concedes that it did not
notify INA and Hartford of Barksdale's
dishonesty, we sustain the conclusion of
the district court that under the terms of
their respective policies INA and Hartford
cannot be held liable for Wilson's losses.
Id. at 1279. Just as the Wilson court found as a matter of
law that Barksdale's actions constituted dishonesty, the jury
in the case at bar found that Home knew of Larry Glad's
dishonesty in mid-December, 1981.
Interrogatory No. 8.)
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(Jury Answer to Special

Judge Hoffman in the Wilson dissent argued, as does
Home in the present case, that the termination clause was
effective only as to "subsequent losses" and was not effective
as to "prior losses." £ci. at 1290-91. However, the majority
noted that this argument had validity only in the situation
where the same insurer is at risk during the entire time at
issue.

So Home's argument would apply in this case only to

F&D, but not to Aetna.

The Wilson majority ruled that to

hold INA and Hartford liable for loss from "acts committed
before the inception of their respective policies by an
employee who was never within the coverage of the policies
[would be an] untenable result."

Id. at 1279 n. 6.

See

also. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Ind. Co., 359
F.2d 579, 583 (5th Cir. 1966) (employer's knowledge of
employee's dishonesty acquired before bond went into effect
prevented coverage from ever going into effect under a policy
provision virtually identical to Section 11.)
In support of its position, Home reinterprets
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Central Bank of
Houston, 672 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App. 1984), which was cited by
Aetna in its original brief in support of this Point I.

Home

claims that the court in F&C v. Central Bank "distinguished
between dishonest acts occurring prior to discovery of
dishonesty and those thereafter."
p. 54.)

(Home Savings' Brief at

This is inaccurate, and it explains why Home finds the
-14-

case "confusing."

The opinion in F&C v. Central Bank

actually distinguished between losses occurring under a prior
bond issued by the same company and those losses which
occurred under the renewal bond in question.

Id. at 650.

Losses were distinguished prior to and after December 11, 1974,
because that was the date the renewal bond was issued;
contrary to Home's contention, that was not the date that
Central Bank learned of employee De Lorenzo's dishonesty.
Id. at 647, 650.

In F&C v. Central Bank, the Texas

Appellate Court correctly found that De Lorenzo was never
within the coverage of the renewal bond, "because a renewal
policy does not reinstate coverage for an employee that had
already been terminated by a known dishonest act."

Id.

Conclusion:
The same result should obtain here.

The jury has

established that Home Savings' management learned of Larry
Glad's dishonesty seven months before management purchased the
Aetna Bond.

Although Home could have made a claim against F&D,

it would be untenable to hold Aetna liable for losses
attributable to Larry Glad, who had been terminated for his
dishonesty seven months before Aetna ever issued its Bond.
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POINT II
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNDER THE BOND
BECAUSE HOME SAVINGS DISCOVERED ITS LOSS
OUTSIDE THE AETNA BOND PERIOD.
Introduction.
There is no coverage under Aetna's contract of
insurance because Home Savings "discovered" its loss on the
AFCO investor loans during the period of F&D's bond.

Under a

discovery bond, the timing of actual monetary damage is not
relevant to the determination of coverage.

Coverage is

determined by discovery, which is when the insured learns of
facts which have or may subject the insured to an
indemnifiable loss.

Tr. Ex. 343, Rider 6091.

E.g.,

First

Natl. Bank of Bowie v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York,
634 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1981).

Accord:

First Natl.

Bank of Fleming v. Maryland Casualty Co.. 581 P.2d 744, 745
(Colo. Ct. App. 1978).

A.

Trial Court's Error.
The trial court misapplied the discovery standard by

inventing the phrase "discovery of loss sustained."
bond contract contains no such language.

The

The trial court's

error is apparent on the face of its August 25, 1987 Order and
Minute Entry:
For purposes of this motion, the court
assumes the evidence establishes as a
-16-

matter of law that dishonesty of
plaintiff's employee, Larry Glad, was known
before the policy period commenced on
June 21, 1982. This discovery of the
dishonesty, however, is not discovery of a
loss sustained. It is not the dishonesty
which is insured, but the loss sustained
thereby. There is no evidence that there
was any loss sustained prior to the
judgment in or settlement of the Armitaae
case. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Report (Def. App. 0 ) , dated June 4, 1982,
itself indicates that plaintiff Home
Savings was subjected only to "possible
losses." A loss cannot be discovered
until sustained; since the latter occurred
during the policy period, the discovery
thereof could not have occurred earlier.
Order and Minute Entry at pp. 1-2, R. at 74-79.1 (emphasis
added.)
Once the trial court equated loss with "damages" and
found no damage until the period of Aetna's coverage, the
outcome was predetermined and the substance of the bond — what
it covers — was eviscerated.

The Bond covers a loss

"discovered" during the bond period.

It does not cover "loss

sustained" during the period of coverage.

To the contrary, it

expressly provides that the actual monetary damages can be
"sustained at any time," and it presumes that damages probably
will occur at a different time from discovery.
Discovery occurs when the insured becomes
aware of facts which would cause a
reasonable person to assume that a loss
covered by the bond has been or will be
incurred even though the exact amount or
details of loss may not be then known.
Notice to the insured of an actual or
potential claim by a third party which
-17-

alleges that the insured is liable under
circumstances, which, if true, would
create a loss under this bond constitutes
such discovery.
Rider 6091 (emphasis added).
The idea that "a loss cannot be discovered until
sustained" is contrary to public policy and common sense.

If

that were the law, fidelity coverage for financial institutions
could only be obtained by deception or by paying unconscionable
premiums.

Any time an insurer became aware of a potential loss

from pending litigation which would not be resolved until after
the renewal date, the surety would avoid coverage by simply
refusing to renew the policy.

The insured could then obtain

coverage only by concealing the potential loss from a new
carrier, or by paying the existing insurer a revised premium
equal to the expected damages.

Such a consequence thwarts the

purpose of insurance and is contrary to public policy.

B*

The Language of Standard Form 22.
Home seeks to circumvent the Bond's discovery

standard by confining its operation to "notice" under
Section 4.

This is improper.

The Bond's preamble is explicit

with regard to the general applicability of the contract's
Conditions and Limitations, of which Section 4 is a key
provision.

The preamble reads as follows:

The Underwriter, in consideration of an
agreed premium, and subject to the
-18-

Declarations made a part hereof, the
General Agreements, Conditions and
Limitations and other terms of this Bond,
agrees with the insured, in accordance with
the Insuring Agreements
hereof . . . with respect to loss
sustained by the Insured at any time but
discovered during the Bond Period, to
indemnify and hold harmless the Insured.
(Emphasis added.)

The Bond reiterates the incorporation and

general applicability of all provisions at the top of page 4,
which reads:
THE FOREGOING INSURING AGREEMENTS AND
GENERAL AGREEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS.
In addition, the title of Section 4 is "LOSS - NOTICE - PROOF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS."

Of course, Section 4 is augmented by the

objective and per se definitions of discovery contained in
Rider 6091. Thus, by its title, by its explicit terms, and by
the Bond's internal references of applicability, discovery of
employee dishonesty pertains to both procedural (i.e., notice)
and substantive (i.e., coverage) aspects of the contract.
The cases are consistent with this policy language:
The discovery provision in question [the
objective and per se definitions found
in Rider 6091] is found in section four of
the bond which is entitled "Conditions and
Limitations." The definition of discovery
clearly acts as a limitation on coverage,
as the bond only applies to losses
"discovered by the Insured during the bond
period."
Home Life Insurance Co. v. Clay, 13 Kan. App. 2d 435, 773
P.2d 666, 677 (1989) (emphasis added).
-19-

See also, Roval

Trust Bank v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 788 F.2d 719
(11th Cir. 1986) (rejection of bank's argument that the
Section 4 discovery definition applied only to notice, but not
to determination of coverage.)

The Bond only makes internal

sense, and it only meshes logically and correctly with prior
and subsequent fidelity policies, if discovery of loss is given
the one established meaning which is addressed in the case law
and defined in Rider 6091.

See, e.g., Central Progressive

Bank v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 658 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1981).
Home's attempt to give the term two distinct meanings
in the same document is an exercise in obfuscation.
Insurance policies, as other contracts,
must be construed as a whole. The meaning
of a contract should always be ascertained
by a consideration of all the pertinent
provisions and never be determined by
critical analysis of a single or isolated
provision.
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 13 Kan. App. 2d 435, 773 P.2d
666, 676 (1989) (citations omitted).
C. Timing of Insured's Actual Loss or Damages is not
Relevant.
In its Brief, Home argues for nine and one-half pages
(see Home's Point I at pp. 35-44) that it could not have
discovered its loss prior to the period of Aetna's Bond because
it had not "sustained" such a loss until the Armitage verdict
was entered against it.

No legal authority is cited in support
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of this proposition.

The cases are all to the contrary —

the

timing of the actual monetary loss is not relevant to the issue
of coverage under a "discovery" bond.

E.g., First National

Bank of Fleming v. Maryland Casualty, 581 P.2d at 745; FNB
Bowie v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 634 F.2d at
1004.
Home's policy argument on this point is a red
herring.

Home contends that if one standard for discovery of

loss determines both notice and coverage, then in order for the
insured to act properly, it would be required to simultaneously
defend against charges of fraud in third party lawsuits while
admitting employee fraud in its notice to its insurer.
a makeweight argument.

This is

A third party complaint constitutes

discovery per se under the Rider 6091 definition.

FNB

Bowie v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y., 634 F.2d at 1004.
Notice of such discovery need only entail a description or
identification of the complaint, much as Home finally provided
to Aetna in its December 1982 letter (Tr. Ex. 140) . This would
be a far different case if Home Savings, like the insured in
FNB Bowie, had simply acted reasonably and prudently by
providing F&D with letters and complaints as they were received
in February, March, April, and May 1982.
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D. Home Savings' Discovery of Loss as a Matter of Lav.
Home finally argues that there was no undisputed
determination by the trial court that Home actually
discovered the loss —
applied —

as the term is correctly defined and

prior to the Bond's period of coverage.

simply not true.

This is

The trial court held: "For purposes of this

motion, the court assumes the evidence establishes as a matter
of law that the dishonesty of plaintiff's employee, Larry Glad,
[which resulted in Home's loss] was known before the policy
period commenced on June 21, 1982."

At the time of the motion,

Aetna had presented the trial court with a wealth of facts to
establish that prior to June 21, 1982, Home Savings was aware
of information that would lead any reasonable person to
conclude that a loss was imminent.
Those facts fall into the following categories:
1. Home's knowledge in December 1981 of the
$15,000 kickback received by Larry Glad from AFCO for
the handling of the AFCO investor loans.
2. Extensive information about the financial
difficulties of the AFCO businesses.
3. Letters from Grant Affleck and attorneys for
investors addressing irregularities and alleging
fraud in the AFCO investor loans.
4. Three lawsuits (one of which was the
predecessor of the Armitaae v. Home Savings case)
alleging fraud and extensive irregularities in the
AFCO investor loans by Home Savings and its
employees, Larry Glad and William Cox.

-22-

5. Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB")
examination reports highlighting irregularities in
the AFCO investor loans and documenting existing
losses.
(R. at 200-200.20.)

The facts were substantiated by a 170 page

Appendix containing 15 uncontested exhibits, most of which
became trial exhibits.

(Cf., Appendix, R. at 2928-3098, with

Tr. Exs. 343, 13, 81, 111, 20, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, and

190.)

In its response to Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment,

Home Savings admitted (R. at 257), or simply did not respond to
most of the facts.

The only one of Aetna's twenty-three

factual statements that Home contested was the timing of its
receipt of a credit report on the AFCO businesses.
Five of the factual statements from Aetna's Summary
Judgment Motion were incorporated into the Stipulated Pretrial
Order's section of Uncontroverted Facts.

These were

paragraph 6: the existence and Home's knowledge of Glad's AFCO
kickback; paragraph 9: knowledge of AFCO bankruptcy; and
paragraph 11: the existence and knowledge of the Bott,
Alcorn, and Clifford Complaints.

All of the factual

statements in support of Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment
were proven at trial.

See Aetna's Appellate Brief at

Statement of Facts, para. 2.a-n; pp. 9-14.

Now, in its

responsive Brief, Home contests only the date when it received
the FHLBB Examination Report (Tr. Ex. 196), but not the content
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nor the fact that the date on the Report predates the purchase
of the Aetna Bond.
As shown, there was overwhelming evidence to
conclude, as the trial court did, that "as a matter of law the
dishonesty of plaintiff's employee, Larry Glad, was known
before the policy period commenced on June 21, 1982."
344.)

(R. at

This evidence not only operated to terminate coverage

for Larry Glad under Section 11 (see Point I, above), but also
constituted discovery of loss by both the objective and
per se standards of Rider 6091. The trial court's error
was in limiting its evidentiary conclusion to the notice issue,
instead of applying it also to the ultimate issue of coverage.

Conclusion.
Discovery of loss sufficient to activate the
Section 4 notice requirement also determines whether
coverage falls under an existing, prior, or subsequent bond.
Under this state of the law, it is inconceivable that Home
Savings can have coverage under Aetna's contract for damages
resulting from the Armitacre case, which was commenced in
April 1982, during the period of F&D's coverage.

In FNB

Bowie, a single letter from an attorney for a third party was
sufficient to establish per se discovery of loss.

It made

no difference that the allegations were then unproven or that
the bank did not believe them.
-24-

The trial court was correct to conclude as a matter
of law that Home had "discovered" Larry Glad's dishonesty (and
its own loss) during the period of F&D's policy, not Aetna's.
But the Court of Appeals should correct the trial court's
misapplication of that finding by now entering judgment in
favor of Aetna.

POINT III
THE JURY'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
2 AND 4 REGARDING HOME'S MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE
APPLICATION PROCESS MANDATE A VOIDING OF THE BOND.
Introduction.
Home's response to this Point III confuses the
alternative grounds on which Aetna prevailed on this issue
at trial, before the trial court set aside the jury's findings
on Special Interrogatories 2 and 4.

A brief overview will help

refocus the legal analysis and the marshalling of evidence.
The relevant statute, U.C.A. § 31-19-8(1) (1974),
deals with affirmative or written insurance applications.

It

has three separate, independent standards for negation of
coverage.

(See discussion at Point III.B. of Aetna's initial

brief, pp. 48-52.)

The first statutory standard, involving

"fraudulent" statements, is not involved here.
§ 31-19-8(1)(a).

U.C.A.

The second statutory standard, involving

misstatements which are material to the insurer's acceptance of
the risk or hazard, is an objective test of materiality.
-25-

Id.

at § 8(1)(b).

The third statutory standard, involving what a

particular insurer would have done if it had known the true
facts, is a subjective test in the nature of detrimental
reliance.

Id. at § 8(1)(c).

These standards were stated in

the disjunctive so that any one of them could negate coverage.
Hardv v. Prudential Ins. Co.. 763 P.2d 761, 766 (Utah 1988).
Special Interrogatory No. 2, as written by the court,
combined in the conjunctive both the second and third statutory
standards.

In its answer to Special Interrogatory No. 2, the

jury had to find both objective material misrepresentations on
the Bond Application form (Tr. Ex. 122), as well as subjective,
detrimental reliance by Aetna on those misstatements in order
to answer the question as it did.

Despite this unnecessarily

high hurdle, the jury found misrepresentations under both
standards.

The trial court's failure to distinguish these

separate, independent standards is apparent in its post-trial
analysis of the subjective evidence (largely the Don Bradshaw
and David Robinson testimony) to conclude that there was
insufficient evidence for the jury to find that an objectively
material misrepresentation had occurred.
Because the trial court's error was the starting
point for this Point III analysis, in its original Brief Aetna
reviewed primarily the sufficiency of the subjective evidence.
(See Point III. A. at pp. 45-48.)

However, the initial focus

on evidence relating to the subjective statutory standard
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should not obscure the significant, independent evidence of
objective, material misrepresentations by Home.

The evidence

of those misrepresentations is reviewed in greater detail in
this Point III at A, below.
Special Interrogatory No. 4 addressed an entirely
separate common law duty to disclose material information, even
if it is not asked for in the application process.

This duty

arises, in part, from the special nature of coverage.

The

common law duty to disclose is also based on an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing which exists in all
contracts.
(Utah 1985).

Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798
Because an insured cannot improve its coverage of

existing circumstances by simply changing policies or insurers,
it has a duty to disclose to a new insurer all facts which are
material to coverage under an existing Bond.

Analysis under

the common law standard is similar to the concept of
unilateral mistake of fact in standard contract formation law
where a contract is void if the non-disclosing party knows or
has reason to know that the mistaken party would consider the
fact material, if it were disclosed.

Kiahtipes v. Mills. 649

P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 1982).
Of course, Aetna prevailed on the common law standard
as well.

The trial court's decision to disregard the jury's

answer on Special Interrogatory No. 4 was based on a legal
conclusion that no duty existed to disclose information outside
-27-

the written application process.

This ruling ignores the

current law which recognizes the continuing importance and
vitality of common law contract principles in the context of
insurance policy formation.
A. Home's Material Misrepresentations on the Bond
Application; U.C.A. S 31-19-8(1)(b).
Contrary to Home's contention, the material facts
which Home misrepresented in the Application really came into
evidence throughout the whole course of trial.

For

instance, Question 17 of the Application (Tr. Ex. 122)
inquired:
List on page 4 all losses sustained by
date, type and amount, whether reimbursed
or not, during the last six years. If
none, so state:
Home responded:

"None over deductible amount [$5,000]."

On

page 4 of the Application, where Home should have listed
information pertaining to losses on the AFCO investor loans
under the heading, "Amount of loss pending," Home made no
entry.
Home Savings also indicated in response to Question
13(c), that the date of its last examination by state or
federal regulatory agencies was "June 1982."

In that very

Report for "Examination as of June 4, 1982," (Tr. Ex. 196), the
FHLBB noted that Home Savings was already booking losses
pertaining to the AFCO investor loans.
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Under the heading,

"Affect on Operations," the examiners stated that "management
had established an $85,000 reserve for uncollected interest on
the loans . . . .
$67,402 . . . ."

The operating loss through May 31 was
(Id. at 2.2) (emphasis added).

The

examiners also wrote that "Hone of the borrowers are making
payments, the loans are scheduled items [read: high risk of
loss] and the institution has commenced foreclosure."
Ex. 196 at 2.)

(Tr.

The examiners further noted the existing

lawsuits by AFCO investors against Home Savings, the nature of
the claims made in those lawsuits, and that rescission of the
AFCO investor loans was a remedy sought.

In summary, the FHLBB

said that "by deviating from normal loan processing procedures,
management has subjected the institution to high scheduled
items ratios, lawsuits and possible losses." (Id. at p 2.1.)
At trial, the jury also heard direct evidence of Home's
knowledge of the AFCO investor lawsuits and attorney letters.
In addition to the foregoing omissions and
misrepresentations, Question 15(c) of the Application asked:
Is there a formal, planned program
requiring segregation of duties so that no
single transaction can be fully controlled
(from origination to posting) by one person?
Home Savings answered "yes" to this question.

However, Home

Savings contended throughout trial that its losses resulted
from Larry Glad having control over multiple facets of the
subject loans, from origination to closing.
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(See, e.g.,

Statement of Facts in Home's responsive Brief, paras. 30, 42,
43, 46-52.)
A misrepresentation is material "if reasonable
insurers would regard the fact as one which substantially
increases the chance that the risk insured against will happen
and therefore would reject the application."

Hardy v.

Prudential Ins. Co.. supra, 763 P.2d 769, 770 (Utah 1988).
The magnitude of the evidence, Home maintains that it answered
the Application correctly and without omissions.
concluded to the contrary.

The jury

The trial court distorted its

analysis in deciding to reject the jury's finding, considering
only the subjective issue of what Aetna would have done if it
had known the true information, but ignoring the jury's
separate finding of objective materiality.

Home has therefore

failed to meet its burden to prove insufficient evidence in
order to have the trial court's rejection of the jury finding
sustained on appeal.

State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424

(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

B. Aetna's Subjective Reliance on Home's Application Form
Misrepresentations on the Application (U.C.A. SS 31-19 8(l)fc)).
In addition to the wealth of objective evidence
presented to the jury, Aetna also offered testimony from the
bond agent, Don Bradshaw, and from Aetna's bond underwriter,
David Robinson, as to the effect of such misrepresentations on
-30-

Aetna's willingness to enter into a contract in light of such
risks.

(See Appellant's Brief, Point III, at 46-48.)

Such

direct testimony was not necessary to support a jury finding on
this point, because the jury could have drawn the inference
from the seriousness of the misrepresentations that no surety
would have written a bond for such risks under those
circumstances.

Nevertheless, the court permitted the testimony

and the jury used it to support their finding.

The trial court

then improperly set aside this jury finding, because it later
decided the supporting testimony was improper.

The jury's

determination should be reinstated and judgment in Aetna's
favor entered accordingly.

C. Home Had a Duty to Volunteer Information Material to the
Risk Insured.
A common law duty of voluntary disclosure was
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Stipcich v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 277 U.S. 311, 316 (1928).
Insurance policies are traditionally
contracts uberrimae fidei and a failure
by the insured to disclose conditions
affecting the risk, of which he is aware,
makes the contract voidable at the
insurer's option.
Concededly the modern practice of requiring
the applicant for life insurance to answer
questions prepared by the insurer has
relaxed this rule to some extent, since
information not asked for is presumably
deemed immaterial.
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(Citations omitted, emphasis added.)

The Stipcich rule was

applied more recently in Collins v. Pioneer Title Ins. Co.,
629 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1980).

The Sixth Circuit there held

that the insured's duty to make a fair disclosure of the facts
means that it must disclose information which is material to
the risk involved.

Id. at 434 (cites omitted).

"Whether

information not disclosed is material is a question of law for
the court."

Id.

(Citations omitted.)

As shown in Point III.C. of Appellant's Brief
(pp. 52-54), Home Savings clearly failed to disclose such
material facts about the AFCO investor loan problems and Larry
Glad's involvement in them.

The jury determined unequivocally

in its answer to Special Interrogatory No. 4 that the
information was both material and omitted.

The common law

standard should be recognized and upheld, and the jury's
determination should be implemented through a reversal in
Aetna's favor.

D. The Issue Was Properly Preserved for Trial and is Ripe
for Appellate Review.
In an effort to circumvent the effect of its
misrepresentations in the Bond application process, Home
contends that the misrepresentation issues were only raised
late in the trial.

This is not true.

Aetna first addressed

these issues in the 12th and 13th defenses of its Answer.
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(R.

at 31-32.)

Although there was some discussion at one point

about waiving those defenses, the defenses were promptly
reinstated and were made part of the Pretrial Order (R. at 738)
where they were addressed in four different places.

In

addition to the court's specific order that they could be
reasserted (id.), Aetna listed misrepresentation as one of
its claims in this case (R. at 722), misrepresentation as a
question of fact for the jury (R. at 730), and the duty to
volunteer information in the application as a question of law
(R. at 732).
Not only was this issue discussed in pretrial
motions, but it was also discussed at great length when Don
Bradshaw, the bond agent, first testified at trial on
November 6, 1987. During cross-examination, Aetna's counsel
attempted to inquire about the Application form.
Ex. 122.)

(Tr.

The trial court took a proffer of evidence outside

the hearing of the jury because it viewed the application issue
as a question of law.

(R. 2906.41.)

In its proffer, Aetna

examined Mr. Bradshaw about the Application form and
specifically about Question No. 17.

(R. 2906.41-51.)

During

part of that examination, a quotation from Mr. Bradshaw's
deposition was published, in which he stated:
If a prospective client has any knowledge
of a loss, he should disclose it in that
application whether it is a possible loss
or a factual loss.
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(R. 2906*46.)

The trial court refused Aetna's request to ask

Mr. Bradshaw, in the hearing of the jury, if the Application
called for any loss information generally.

(R. 2906.50.)

However, further evidence regarding the Application form was
elicited from both Mr. Bradshaw and from Aetna's
representative, David Robinson, later in the case.
2916.11, .20-23, .51-52.)

(R. at

The jury heard that testimony and

made a common sense determination of what should have been
disclosed in the

Application.

Based on the trial evidence, the jury concluded that
Home Savings' responses constituted material misrepresentations
and that those misrepresentations were subjectively critical
to Aetna's decision to issue the Bond.

Furthermore, the jury

concluded that, given the nature and form of the inquiries in
the application process, Home Savings should have volunteered
pertinent information about potential losses to Aetna.

The

issues were tried on the evidence and decided by the jury.

The

result should be sustained in Aetna's favor over the
machinations of Home Savings and the mistakes of the trial
court.
E. Aetna May Rescind Coverage with Respect to Larry Glad
Only or it May Rescind the Entire Bond.
In Special Jury Interrogatory No. 2, the jury decided
that if Aetna had known the facts misrepresented or not

-34-

disclosed by Home, "it would not have issued the bond or
would have excluded the risk disclosed."

Home never disclosed

risks related to the dishonesty of Larry Glad.

Therefore, the

bond was void ab initio with respect to Larry Glad, because
"the provision in each bond relating to discovery of employee
dishonesty does not cause a forfeiture of the entire bond . . .
[R]ather, this provision simply provides that the blanket
coverage of the bond does not extend to employees of the
insured who are known by the insured to be dishonest."

C.

Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Co. of N.Am., 464 F. Supp.
1, 17 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd.. 590 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert, denied 444 U.S. 831 1929.
As stated in the Introduction, Aetna contracted to
provide fidelity coverage to Home only as to the generic
employee population.

Therefore, Aetna may rescind coverage for

the risk it would have excluded had it been informed of Larry
Glad's specific dishonesty; and it can do so without a refund
because no premium was ever received for that risk.

Since

"there was never any coverage as to [Larry Glad], there was
never anything which could be forfeited."

Id.

Aetna may also rescind the entire bond because of
misrepresentation and non-disclosure.

The general rule is

that a "return of the premium is not essential to the avoidance
of a policy, nor is its retention a waiver, especially . . .
where knowledge of the ground of avoidance is first obtained
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after a loss."

44 Am. Jur. 2d § 1646.

The several cases cited

by Home in support of its theory that Aetna has waived its
right to rescind the policy are inapposite because in every
instance the insurer performed some affirmative act which
ratified the existence of the policy after having discovered
grounds for rescission.

For instance, in Dairyland Ins. Co.

v. Kammerer, 327 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Neb. 1982), the insurer was
deemed to have ratified the policy by giving notice of
cancellation of the coverage on a date after its discovery of
grounds for rescission, and by retaining the premium through
the date of cancellation.

In Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813,

814 (Utah 1968), a purchaser of a business attempted to
renegotiate the purchase price while continuing to operate the
business after he had discovered grounds for rescinding the
contract.

In that case, the court held that he waited too long

to attempt to rescind. Id. at 815.

In Verex Assurance, Inc.

v. J. Hanson Sav. & Loan, 816 F. 2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987,) the
insurer was deemed to have waived its right to rescind because
it accepted premiums after receiving notice of a reason to
rescind.

See also. Farrinaton v. Granite State Fire Ins.

Co. of Portsmouth, 232 P.2d 754 (Utah 1951).

By contrast, in

this case no act of Aetna was inconsistent with rescission of
coverage for losses from the AFCO investor loans, and so
coverage should not be created by an imputed waiver.
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The doctrine of reliance also validates rescission
without immediate refund of premium.

An excellent example is

Robertson v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Arkansas, Inc..
668 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (W.D. Ark. 1987), where the court held
that the insured could not invoke the doctrine of estoppel
against an insurer in the absence of any proof that the insured
changed his position for the worse in reliance on the insurer's
failure to refund a premium.

Similarly, in Pi Santo v.

Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 489 F.Supp. 1352, 1360 (E.D. Pa.
1980), the insurer was not estopped from denying coverage on
the ground of failure to return the unearned portion of the
premiums until three and one-half years after accident.
Home has not introduced any facts to show that Aetna
ratified the Bond after discovering grounds for rescission
either by collecting further premiums or by attempting to
cancel the Bond.

Nor can Home show that it relied on Aetna's

coverage to its detriment, especially where it failed to
disclose material facts and could have made a claim for
coverage under the existing F&D bond when it became aware of
those facts.
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POINT IV
THE TRADING EXCLUSION VOIDS
COVERAGE UNDER THE BOND FOR LOSSES ON
THE AFCO INVESTOR LOANS.
Introduction.
Home Savings agrees with Aetna that the purpose of
the Bond's trading exclusion (Rider 6030a) is to omit from
coverage the type of risk associated with securities
transactions.

(Home Savings' Brief at p. 79.)

Therefore,

the question for appeal is whether the losses in this case
arose out of trading in securities and whether that issue has
been properly preserved for review by the Court of Appeals.
A. Trial Court Made Improper Legal Interpretation and
Application of Rider 6030a.
Aetna's appeal on this issue is from the trial
court's ruling in denying Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment
on the trading exclusion.

The trial court did not give the

trading exclusion rider its full, intended operation in
light of the Armitage judgment.

Home Savings calls the trial

court's decision at summary judgment an "analytical opinion."
But a careful reading proves exactly the opposite.

Without

legal support or policy analysis, the trial court essentially
stated the same tautology repeatedly:
The nature of the evidence, jury
instructions, and verdict in Armitage
necessarily requires the nomenclature
"involved in the sale or exchange of
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securities" to characterize Home's conduct
and the jury's findings. Such
"involvement," however, does not
necessarily equate to "trading" in
securities as that term is used in
Rider SR6030a.
Facilitation of a sale may constitute a
sale under various securities statutes, but
it does not necessarily constitute trading
in securities as that term is used in
Rider 6030a.
[A]n inherent finding of the prescribed
acts "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security" . . is not
necessarily the equivalent of the finding
that Home traded securities.
(R. at 329-330.)
The trial court erred in this ruling.

Securities

coverage was expressly culled out of Standard Form No. 22
because of the special risks inherent in that type of
activity.

Shearson/American Express v. First Continental Bank

& Trust Co., 579 F.Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1984).

That being the

case, it was not the intention of the parties or the purpose of
the Bond to cover losses resulting from a jury verdict of
direct and secondary liability for securities law violations.
As Home Savings acknowledges, the relevant securities
in the Armitaae case were the promissory notes and trust
deeds between AFCO and its investors.
Instruction No. 5.03, R. at 210.48.)

(See Armitaae Jury
It was in the context of

trading in these securities that Home Savings was held liable
in the Armitaae case.

Home was not held liable because it
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was a lender to the AFCO investors, but because of its direct
involvement with and support of Grant Affleck in the sale of
the AFCO securities.
Contrary to Home's argument, the AFCO investor
lending activity was unprecedented.

Home Savings had only done

5 or 10 second mortgage loans for insiders prior to the AFCO
investor loans commencing in November 1981.
Testimony, R. at 2914.96, 2905.34-.35.)

(William H. Cox

In addition, Home had

never used an outside loan broker such as Grant Affleck to
solicit loans and process loan applications in the volume and
with the pre-qualification commitments involved in this case.
Fred Smolka testimony at R. at 2917.154, .160-.161, .179.)
Trial Exhibits 8, 9, 10, 11, 89, and 90 document the
negotiations of Home's management and its agreements with
Affleck.

In the Armitage lawsuit, Home was held liable for

aiding and abetting Grant Affleck, not Larry Glad, and for
controlling Affleck in the context of security violations.
Under these circumstances, there is no justification
for the restrictive application which the trial court gave to
the trading exclusion.

The proper approach is demonstrated in

Sutro Bros. & Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North
America, 264 F.Supp. 273 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).

In that case,

coverage for a securities broker was denied under a trading
exclusion when the broker's agent accepted uncertified funds in
exchange for delivery of securities.
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The Federal District

Court there held that the loss was necessarily sustained
directly or indirectly from trading and was therefore not
covered by the fidelity provisions of the bond.

Id. at 289.

Coverage was excluded even though the loss was immediately
caused by a bad check [here, rescinded second mortgage loans to
the AFCO investors], because the loss occurred in the context
of securities trading.
B. The Issue was Properly Presented to the Trial Court and
Preserved for Appeal.
In response to Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment,
the trial court ruled as a matter of law that none of Home's
various securities violations "necessarily equate to 'trading'
in securities as that term is used in Rider SR6030a."
329.)

(R. at

The trial court's Minute Entry was not a "final

judgment" subject to immediate appeal.
of Civil Procedure.

Rule 54(b), Utah Rule

Nevertheless, the decision became the law

of the case for purposes of trial, and it is now appealable.
Even after summary judgment, the issue of the trading
exclusion was addressed, to a limited extent, in the actual
trial.

(See; "Defendant's Claims" and "Contested Issues of

Fact" in the Stipulated Pretrial Order, R. at 722 and 730; Tr.
Exs. 113-115, 196, 330, 356, and 357-360; Aetna's closing
arguments, R. at 2917.180 - .226; and Aetna's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, R. at 1364-1368.)

However, Aetna did not attempt
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to present the issue directly to the jury because the trial
court's ruling had eviscerated any factual issue.

After having

raised the issue in summary judgment and receiving an adverse
legal ruling, it was not necessary for Aetna to browbeat the
court with constant repetition of its claims.

The trial court

was aware throughout the proceedings that Aetna vehemently
disagreed with several of its rulings on summary judgment
issues (see, e.g., R. at 2923.224-.226.).

A party does not

lose appellate rights on such fundamental matters by refusing
to be obstreperous at the trial level.
Conclusion.
Home Savings7 argument that the loan to AFCO
investors was its usual and ordinary course of business, and
therefore not trading in securities, is intriguing in light of
this unique chapter in Utah's history.

The nature and reach of

the AFCO scheme throughout the Utah financial community was
unparalleled.

Criminal and civil convictions for security law

violations in a series of uniform loan transactions by a number
of different lenders made to borrowers who were brought in bulk
to lending institutions by an outside broker is without
precedent.

It is exactly this unique and novel type of risk

for which the trading exclusion, Rider 6030a, was designed.
The Court of Appeals should make a proper legal interpretation
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of that key part of the contract of insurance and reverse the
trial court's summary judgment ruling.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE JURY
TO CONSIDER HOME'S BAD BUSINESS JUDGMENT AND
MISMANAGEMENT AS CAUSES OF THE AFCO INVESTOR LOSSES.
Introduction.
The Aetna Bond contained a causation requirement
imposing liability on Aetna only for "loss resulting directly
from one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an
Employee."

Tr. Ex. 343, Rider 6041. However, the jury made

a finding of causation in Home's favor only because the
combination of jury instructions and the Special Verdict form
prevented consideration of whether the conduct of Home Savings'
management constituted a separate and superseding cause of its
loss.

The record is filled with evidence that Home's officers

and directors initiated and were actively involved in the AFCO
loan program.

(See, e.g., testimony of William H. Cox at

Tab O of Aetna's Document Appendix.)

However, the trial court

refused to allow the jury to consider whether management's
conduct constituted an alternate or superseding cause of the
losses.
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A. Home#s Losses Were Caused by its Own Management
Decisions,
The Armitage v. Home Savings case focused on Home's
primary and secondary liability for fraud in the sale or
exchange of AFCO securities.

The Armitage case was not the

only suit involving AFCO investors; sixteen other financial
institutions (none of which employed Larry Glad) also made such
loans and experienced similar results.

Home's line of credit

to AFCO and its authorization to make up to $3 million in
second mortgage loans to AFCO investors were both approved by
Home's management and the Board of Directors, independent of
Larry Glad.

After Larry Glad was terminated, Home continued to

process and complete loans to AFCO investors.

Although it was

alleged that Glad falsified information which resulted in loans
to unqualified borrowers, the Armitage court imposed
liability on Home because the nature of the transactions
mandated a rescission of the loans.

Home, like many of Utah's

other lending institutions, would have suffered a loss on the
AFCO investor loans even if Larry Glad were found to have been
completely honest.

Therefore, management's conduct was the one

effective cause, and the superseding cause of the losses.
The trial court denied Aetna the opportunity to have
the jury consider any cause for Home's losses other than the
conduct of Larry Glad.

Under the rule that the law will not

permit one to profit from his own wrong, an insured under a
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fidelity bond cannot recover if he has "knowledge of, or has
countenanced, has acquiesced in or participated in the wrongful
acts of his employees." Home Indemnity Co. v. Reynolds &
Co., 187 N.E.2d 274, 283 (111. App. 1963) (citation omitted).
If a corporation itself is "party to the acts complained of,
there can be no recovery . . . . A policy of fidelity insurance
does not insure an employer against his own fraud."

Levey v.

Jamison, 82 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1936) (citations
omitted).

The jury, in its common wisdom, knew what was right:

"the participation of high level officers of the Bank in a
course of action determined at a high level to be in the best
interests of the Bank prevents the Bank from obtaining
indemnity . . . under the fidelity7 provisions of the bond."
State Street Bank v. U.S.F.&G., 539 N.E.2d 779, 781 (111.
App. 4 Dist. 1989).

Aetna tried to have the jury decide

whether the direct participation of Home's management in the
AFCO investor loans constituted a separate and superseding
cause of the loss.

However, even though the trial court

allowed the jury to hear a great deal of evidence regarding
management's misconduct, it prevented the jury from considering
management's role in the fiasco.
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B. Aetna Properly Preserved the Jury Instruction and Special
Verdict for Review on Appeal,
The required specificity in objection to a jury
instruction is whether the trial court understands the
nature of the objection and can make timely corrections.
Employees Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Allen Oil Co.,
258 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1953).

If an objection is made in

conference, there is no requirement that it be exhaustively
repeated in open court in order to preserve it for appellate
review.

Watters v, Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1981)

(compliance with Rule 51 where court was aware of objection to
absence of jury instructions as a result of conference with
counsel); Pagan v. Thrift City, Inc.. 460 P.2d 832, 833-34
(Utah 1969) (trial court conference with counsel to discuss
jury instructions found to be appropriate time to object.)
At this late date, the suggestion by Home's counsel
that the trial court was not put on adequate notice of Aetna's
objections is disingenuous.

Home's counsel was present during

numerous and lengthy conferences with the trial judge regarding
jury instructions, Special Verdict form, and the Special
Interrogatories.

In fact, so much time was devoted to these

conferences that they were held on the Saturday before the case
was presented to the jury and on evenings following court
sessions, after the court staff and court reporter had gone
home.

(R. at 2917.58.)

Before the instructions were
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presented to the jury, the court instructed counsel off the
record that it was only necessary to state the subject matter
of the objectionable instructions, rather than the specific
numbers, because the reasons for the objections had already
been discussed during the previous conferences and the court
was in a hurry to submit the case to the jury.

R. at

2917.59.
1.

Proposed Jury Instructions No. 2 and No. 42.

With regard to Instruction Nos. 2 and 42, Aetna's
counsel tried briefly to state reasons for objections, despite
the court's instructions, in order to create at least a basic
record of the basis for such objections.

When Aetna's

objection to the failure to give proposed Instruction No. 2 is
considered in light of the text of that instruction
(mismanagement as a sole and proximate cause of loss), there is
no question as to Aetna's concern.

The failure to give the

instruction left the jury with no affirmative away to rule in
Aetna's favor on its primary factual defense.
Aetna's objection on the court's failure to give
proposed Instruction No. 42 was likewise adequate.

That

instruction, and the concept of officers and directors being a
contributing cause of Home's losses, was a repeated and major
topic of both the evidence and the in camera

conferences.

When the objection was made on the record, the trial court's
awareness of its substance was demonstrated by its asking only
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for clarification of Aetna's burden of proof on that issue.
(R. at 2917.63 1. 23-25.)
2.

Objectionable Jury Instructions Nos. 26-30.

Under Rule 51, it is the duty of the trial court to
cover the theories of both parties in its instructions.

To

determine if this is accomplished, the instructions must be
considered as a whole.
(Utah 1951).

Startin v. Madsen. 237 P.2d 834, 836

Except for Instruction No. 29, which was not

individually objectional, Jury Instructions Nos. 26 through 30,
when taken as a whole, misled the jury.

Because of those

instructions, the jury concluded that it was entirely precluded
from considering whether management7s involvement in the AFCO
investor loans was a cause of Home Savings' losses.
explains the jury's frustration.

This

After hearing weeks' of

testimony about mismanagement, the trial court gave the jury no
way to use such information.

The cumulative effect of Jury

Instructions Nos. 26 through 30 is reviewable under Rule 51,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the court to
exercise review at its discretion and in the interests of
justice.
3.

Special Verdict Form.

The rule is that "if . . . the court omits any issue
of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each
party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so
omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its
-48

submission to the jury."

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 49.

Aetna submitted a proposed Special Verdict form which contained
the following Question No. 6:
Did any loss sustained by Home Savings
directly result from the mismanagement,
misconduct, and/or failure to follow safe
and sound lending practices?
(R. at 1219.)

It is true that Aetna's counsel prepared the

final Special Verdict form in order to relieve typing demands
on the court staff, but it did so with instruction from the
trial court as to the final form the Verdict would take. By
accommodating the court's need for additional typing resources,
Aetna certainly did not waive its prior Rule 49 demand that
Question No. 6 be presented to the jury.
4.

Review of Error by Court of Appeals.

Even if the objections stated in the record are found
to be deficient, this court, "in its discretion and in the
interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to give
an instruction."

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51.

Where Aetna presented substantial evidence in support of its
theory of causation, it was entitled to have the issue
submitted to the jury.

The circumstances limiting the

opportunity to make a more complete statement of the nature of
its objections, and the fact that the instructions taken as
whole prevented the jury from addressing the issue, dictate
that Aetna be granted a new trial.
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C. Aetna Was Prejudiced by the Special Verdict Form and the
Jury Instructions as Given.
Aetna was prejudiced by the combination of omitted
instructions (proposed Nos. 2 and 42), the effect of the
instructions actually given (Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26), and
the truncated Special Verdict without Aetna's proposed question
No. 6.

The primary way to demonstrate that prejudice is to

show what the jury would have decided had it understood and
been presented the opportunity to do so.
juror affidavits were obtained.

For that purpose, the

R. at 2032-53, 2055-57.

(Copies of the juror affidavits are included at Tab J of
Aetna's Document Addendum.)

The jury in this case bemoaned the

fact the case had been "taken away from it" by the instructions
and limited verdict.
Of course, prejudice can also be determined by
independent analysis of the reviewing court.

Even without the

jurors' direct comments, it is evident that Aetna's causation
theories were omitted from the jury's consideration.

Where a

defendant's primary factual defense is presented to the finder
of fact only as the unspoken negative of the plaintiff's case,
the prejudice is patent.

The case should be remanded for a

fair determination based upon an equal explanation of the
competing theories of the case.
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POINT VI
WITHOUT F&D MARYLAND AS A PARTY,
COMPLETE RELIEF WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO AETNA.
F&D was a necessary party to the action because "in
[its] absence, complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties."

Rule 19, U.R.Civ.P.

A primary issue

throughout the case was coverage based upon discovery under the
Standard Form 22's objective and per se standards.
(Rider 6091.)

Specifically, Aetna contracted with Home to

cover only losses discovered within the period of its
coverage.

Standard Form 22 specifically excludes coverage for

losses discovered i inder prior or subsequent policies.

To the

extent the ioss in this case was caused by employee infidelity
(Rider 6041), coverage was only available under F&D's prior
bond because i t v* as the contract i n place when Home made its
discovery.
The trial court was unable to read Aetna's policy
correctly in the absence of F&D as a party.

For instance, on

the Section 11 issue, the trial concluded before trial that
Aetna's position would enable an insurer to collect premiums
for providing no coverage.

This conclusion ignored the

circumstances of the case.

There was coverage, to the extent

there was a valid fidelity claim.

But it was F&D which

collected premiums from Home in exchange for that coverage.
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The trial court also became tangled up in Home's
Section 11 argument of "prior" and "subsequent" losses. That
distinction was only relevant to coverage under F&D's policy.
See. Point I, above; C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance
Co. of North America. 464 F. Supp. 1, 17 (D.S.C. 1977),
aff'd., 590 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444
U.S. 831. But the trial court lost sight of the correct
analysis because of F&D's absence from the case.
The prejudice to Aetna from F&D's absence is apparent
in the trial court's skewed analysis.

The issue at trial

should not have been whether there was or was not coverage
under the Aetna Bond.

The proper analysis should have been

whether coverage was barred by both bonds because of
management's participation (Point V) or the trading exclusion
(Point IV), and if not, which of the losses were covered by
F&D's policy.

The obvious prejudice is grounds for reversal.
POINT VII

A JUDGMENT MUST ACCURATELY
REFLECT THE ACTUAL DAMAGES PROVEN AT TRIAL.
Home Savings does not contest the $237,760.77 of
actual monetary benefit it received from proceeds of the 36
AFCO investor loans.

Instead, Home argues that the issue was a

jury question, and that by failing to explicitly reserve the
issue Aetna waived its right to have the trial court include
the setoff in calculation of the judgment.
-52-

This position is directly contrary to the one Home
took in the trial rourt

There, it agreed that the calculation

of damages was a matter reserved to the trial court.
By stipulation of counsel, the jury was not
asked to identify a loss amount
attributable to each loan, nor to add
losses in order to calculate damages.
(Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Proposed Judgment, R. at
18 0.3 ) The fact of this agreement is demonstrated by the
complete absence in the Stipulated Pretrial Order of any amount
of damages or any affirmative submission of damages to the jury
as a disputed issue of fact.

The reservation of damages is

also supported by the form of the Special Verdict, which makes
no mention of the amount of the AFCO investor loans.
Presumably, Home would not be satisfied with a judgment based
solely on the jury's determinations, as they include no measure
of actual monetary damages.
The truth of the matter is that the parties reserved
a number of issues in this very complicated case for
determination after trial.

This was consistent with Home's

prior course of conduct in the Armitaae case.

In Armitacre,

as here, the jury was simply asked to enter a special verdict
on liability-

(R. at 1347-1350; copy at Tab C of Aetna's

Document Addendum.)

The calculation of damages was reserved

for the trial court, which ironed out the complicated issues of
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accounting, including proper setoffs, after trial.

(See

Armitaae Judgment on Special Verdict, Tr. Ex. 330.)
There being no issue as to the amount of Home
Savings' benefit from the AFCO investor loan as reflected in
Trial Exhibit 83, the question for appeal is whether the trial
court entered a judgment which is fair and accurate on the
basis of the evidence.

The answer is "no." The proper

approach to this type of situation is demonstrated in Everhart
v. Drake Management, Inc., 627 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1980).

In

that case, the court held that a fidelity bond did not cover
shortfalls in one account when the insured made a business
decision to apply limited funds to other accounts.
[The insured] suffered no increase in
liability as a result of the permanent
investment funds being deposited to a
general company account. [The insured]
merely experienced a shifting of
liabilities for which it was not entitled
to recover against the Insurer. Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. Usaform Hail Pool, Inc.,
463 F.2d 4, 5 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 691.
In the present case, Home Savings consciously took
almost a quarter of a million dollars of revenue from the AFCO
investor loans and allocated it to its other business
purposes.

(Tr. Ex. 83.)

As previously shown, the purpose of

the Bond is not to cover losses which naturally arise from
management decisions and the ups and downs of ordinary
business.

An insured should not be allowed to increase a
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covered loss by its choices of revenue allocation.

If the

Court, of Appeals does not reverse the trial court's judgment on
the basis of the foregoing points, it should remand with
instructions to reduce the judgment by $237,760.77, which was
Home Savi ngs' profi t from the AFCO i i ivestor loans as reflected
in Home's own Trial Exhibit No. 83.
POINT VIII
HOME SAVINGS IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION
FOR THE LEGAL FEES AWARDED TO THE ARMITAGE PLAINTIFFS
NOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEYS'
FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDING THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION.
A. Home Savings is not Entitled to Indemnification of Legal
Fees Awarded to the Armitaae Plaintiffs.
Home cannot recover the amount it paid the Armitaae
plaintiffs7 for legal fees ($190,647.31), because those fees
derived from claims which are expressly excluded from bond
coverage.

Fees were awarded under the Utah Securities law,

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(1)(b) and violation of the
truth-in-lending laws (see 15 U.S.C.A. §1640(a)(3); and Utah
Code Ann, % 70b-5-203(1)(c)). Of course, violations of
securities laws are excluded by the Bond's trading exclusion.
(See Point IV, above.)

And the losses from violatipns of

truth-in-lending laws were caused by Home's officers, Bill Cox
and Elaine Reese.
The evidence shows that Elaine Reese, a corporate
officer of Home (R. at 2903.116, 11. 9-12) who was responsible
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for preparing the loan closing documents (R. at 2093.121 1. 8),
initially backdated loan documents at the direction of her
immediate superior, Bill Cox (R. at 2903.112, 11. 2-12).
Subsequent violations, even if influenced by Larry Glad, were
caused by Elaine Reese because Larry Glad had no authority to
instruct her to backdate loan documents and she did not work
for him.

(R. at 2903.151, 11. 20-25.)

She also failed to get

approval from her supervisor, Bill Cox, for any backdating of
documents after the first loan.
2903.112, 11. 16-17.)

(R. at 2903.113, 11. 10-12;

Prior to trial, Home specifically

elected to limit its claim to only those losses caused by Larry
Glad.

(Stipulated Pretrial Order, R. at 719-731.)

And the

jury was instructed that only losses caused by Larry Glad would
be covered.

(Jury Instruction No. 22.)

Therefore, even if

losses from the truth-in-lending violations were covered by the
Bond, Home's claim does not reach them.
B. Home Savings May Not be Awarded Legal Fees Incurred in
Defending the Annitage Litigation for Losses That are Not
Covered by the Bond.
The purpose of Aetna's stipulating to the
reasonableness of $437,500 for Home's Armitaae defense costs
was to establish actual amounts, while preserving the issue
of ultimate entitlement based on legal issues of coverage under
the Bond.

(Stipulation, R. at 2850-2853.)
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Aetna reserved the

right to appeal which part, if any, of the reasonable legal
fees are actually attributable to claims covered under the Bond.
The trial court erred in finding that the fees for
the Armitage defense were wholly covered under the Bond.

The

Armitage verdict was based on cla :i ms wh i ch were i lot covered
by the Bond, i.e., securities and truth-in-lending
violations.

Aetna's liability, if any, to Home for defense

costs in the Armitage litigation should be limited to the
proportion of fees attributable to covered allegations, and it
should not include fees and costs for losses outside the Bond's
coverage.
CONCLUSION
In this appeal, a favorable decision on any of
Aetna's first four points (Points I-IV), requires reversal of
the trial court's decision and the entry of judgment in
Aetna's favor.

Those points are absolute defenses.

Section 11

of the Bond barred Home's claim against Aetna because Home knew
Larry Glad was dishonest before it contracted with Aetna.
Aetna never accepted any risks or premiums related to that
known dishonest employee.

Home also "discovered,f its loss, as

that term is defined in the contract, during the F&D bond
period.

In addition, Home failed to disclose either Glad's

dishonesty or its actual and pending losses on the AFCO
investor loans in the Aetna Bond Application process. And
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finally, the transactions for which Home was held liable in
Armitaae constituted trading in securities, which were
excluded from coverage.
If the Court disagrees with all the preceding points,
then the case should nevertheless be remanded for further
proceedings on two separate grounds.

The conduct of Home's

management constituted a separate or superseding cause of
Home's losses, and a jury should be allowed to make that
determination.

(Point V.)

In addition, F&D was an

indispensable party to this action, and the jury should have
had the opportunity to decide which of the two sureties (if
either) should have provided coverage.

(Point VI.)

If the

Court of Appeals does not agree that all of the foregoing
points entitle Aetna to a favorable ruling, then Home's
judgment should be reduced as set forth in Points VII
and VIII.
A just and equitable result requires reversal of the
trial court's rulings and judgment with instructions to enter
judgment in Aetna's favor based on one or more of the sound
points of this appeal.
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